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Private Enforcement of the Social Contract:
DeShaney and the Second Amendment Right to
Own Firearms
David E. Murley*
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infinged.1
The Supreme Court of the United States has a duty to interpret
the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). 2 That is no mystery,
but one may inquire - why does the Court choose to actively
interpret one particular amendment and not another?. Deep in the
recesses of American history lies the answer to this question, I am
sure.
The Second Amendment to the Constitution codified the common
law right to keep and bear arms. This amendment was originally
proposed in 1787, debated in 1789, and adopted in 1791. It was first
interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1876,3 but since then, has only
been revisited infrequently and indecisively by the Court. The
premise of this article is that the Court has been derelict in its duty
to interpret the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
Since 1939, the Court has not decided a case challenging the
Second Amendment 4 During the next six decades, the Court
repeatedly denied certiorari to cases addressing the issue of "gun
control."5 The Court should cease its blatant neglect of the right to
* M.A. Michigan State University, J.D. Georgetown University Law Center. Currently the
author serves on the legal staff of the Honorable John M. Engler, Governor of Michigan. The
author would like to thank Professor Don Wallace, Georgetown University Law Center, for
his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend H.
2. Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.. . This is of the very essence of judicial
duty." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
3. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
4. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
6. Petitions for certiorari were filed in twenty-three cases after the Miller decision
Twenty-one petitions were denied. See Cases v. United States, 131 F2d 916 (P.R. 1942), cert
denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); United States v. Lauchli, 444 F2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1971); United States v. Tomlin, 454 F2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
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keep and bear arms and define for American citizens the
parameters of the Second Amendment.
6
The Court's unwillingness to grant certiorari to Second
Amendment cases has prolonged the bitter national debate
concerning the right to keep and bear arms. Second Amendment
interpretations do not quibble over details, such as "where the line
is drawn," as one might expect on other constitutional issues such
as free speech or a defendant's right to legal representation. Few
academics have commented on the Second Amendment. Most
simply ignore the right to bear arms when discussing fundamental
rights guaranteed citizens by the Constitution.7 Some liberal
denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
. 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, Pa., 477 F2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 843 (1973); United States v. Warin, 530 F2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Oakes, 564 E2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978); Quilci v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States v. Rose, 695 F2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 836 (1983); United States v. Breier, 827 F2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
960 (1988); United States v. Hale, 978 F2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997
(1993); United States v. Farmer, 1 F3d 1234 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 242
(1997), reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 594 (1997); Slesarik v. Luna County, 13 F.3d 32 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1072 (1994); United States v. Vargas, 19 F3d 32 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, sub nom. Berduzco v. US, 512 U.S. 1240 (1994); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F3d 120 (4th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 260 (1995); United States v. Marchant, 55 F3d 509 (10th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 260 (1995); United States v. Farrell, 69 F3d 891 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996); United States v. Rybar, 103 F3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 46 (1997); United States v. Kirk, 105 F3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct 47 (1997); United States v. Wright, 117 E3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct 584 (1997).
The Court granted certiorari in two cases, but did not address the Second Amendment
question. United States v. Tot, 131 F3d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. granted, 317 U.S. 623 (1943),
rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1939); United States v. Synnes, 438 F2d 764 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. granted and vacated, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972).
6. The underdeveloped state of Second Amendment caselaw is analogous to the Court's
infrequent interpretations of the First Amendment before the early Twentieth Century. Prior
to that time, the Court had not yet issued "a single decision establishing the First
Amendment as an amendment of any genuine importance at all." William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuKE LJ. 1236, 1239 (1994).
7. Sanford Levinson states, "I think it is accurate to say that no one recognized by the
legal community as a major writer on Constitutional Law has deigned to turn his or her
talents to a full consideration of the [Second] Amendment." Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE IJ. 637 (1989). Levinson also quotes L.H. LaRue
as stating, "[t]he Second Amendment is not taken seriously by most scholars." Id. at 640
(citing L.. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BuFF L REV., 373, 375
(1987)). Levinson also notes that the "leading" casebooks and treatises barely mention the
Second Amendment, if they mention it at all. Levinson, supra, at 639 n.14, 642 (citing
LAURENCE H. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTItrTONAL LAw (2d ed. 1988); J. NowAK Er AL,
CONs'rrrmoNAL LAW (3d ed. 1986)).
Private Enforcement of the Social Contract
scholars who do address the right to bear arms dismiss it as a relic
harking back to an era when states needed militias to guard against
encroachment by the federal government.8 Other scholars, often
from the conservative end of the political spectrum, ignore the
Amendment's language concerning the necessity for a "militia," and
base their arguments on the phrase, "the right of the people."9
Despite one's viewpoint, the legal issues involved require
clarification before any meaningful debate is possible.
In this article, I consider the origins of the Second Amendment,
its relation to other fundamental rights, and its interpretation by
the Court. This article answers the question, "Does the Second
Amendment imply an individual's right to armed self-defense?" The
answer is an unequivocal "yes." What is more important, this article
introduces a novel reading of the Second Amendment. Rather than
providing mere recitations of the Court's prior holdings regarding
an individual's right to self-defense, this article analyzes that right
in the light of DeShaney v. Winnebago County,10 in which the
Court held that the State is under no duty to protect an individual
not in the involuntary physical custody of the State.
Part I of this article explores whether the Second Amendment is
a "collective" right, applicable only to a state's right to maintain a
militia, or an "individual" right, applicable to all citizens. Part II
examines past Supreme Court cases interpreting the right to keep
and bear arms, which, as already noted, reveals no decisions since
1939. This section also discusses whether the Second Amendment
prohibits state and local bans on firearms. Part m1 concludes that
only the individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment
is viable after DeShaney.
I DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECT AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMs?
Introduction
Does the Second Amendment protect an individual right to bear
arms, or does it merely guarantee that states are free to maintain a
8. See LA. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 W. & MARY
L REv. 1311, 1398 (1997); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individua;Cs Right to
Arms, 31 GA. L REv.. 1, 57 (1996); Jeremy Rabkin, Constitutional Firepower New Light on
the Meaning of the Second Amendment, 86 J. CRmL L & CRmnINoLoGY 231, 232 (1995).
9. See David C. Williams, The Constitutional Right to "Conservative" Revolution, 32
HARv. C.R-C.L L REv. 413, 416 (1997); Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second
Amendment to Gun Control Legislation, 58 MoNT. L REv. 79, 95 (1997).
10. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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militia? The perplexing language of the Second Amendment
obscures the issue concerning a citizen's right to bear arms. To one
unfamiliar with the origins of the Second Amendment, terms such
as "militia" and "the right of the people" appear mutually exclusive.
This is not so. Rather, these terms complement each other. Many
scholars believe that the Framers intended the Second Amendment
to protect both an individual right and a collective right - a
multifaceted right belonging to the "body of the people." 1
This article focuses on the individual right recognized by the
Second Amendment, rather than the "well-regulated militia"
12
preamble of the amendment. 13 The militia envisioned by the
Founders might be relevant today, or totally irrelevant. Whatever
the Founders intended concerning the militia, they also intended to
recognize an individual right to bear arms.1
4
Collective Rights
Proponents of the "collective rights" school of thought interpret
the Second Amendment solely as a guarantee to states that they
may raise and maintain armies as a check against potential federal
tyranny. Relying on the phrase, "a well-regulated militia, being
necessary to the security of a free state," this school contends that
the only right the Second Amendment confers is the state's right to
maintain a militia or an organized government-sponsored military
unit, such as the National Guard. 5 In addition, this group views the
11. See, e.g., Robert Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to
Self-Defense Against Criminals and Despots, 8 STAN. L & POLY REv. 25, 27 n.31 (1997).
12. Perhaps the Founders intended the militia to describe the body of arms-bearing
citizens, or a loosely-organized group that could be activated by Congress in time of
emergency.
13. This article will not consider what weapons the Second Amendment protects, or
when the government can legitimately curb the possession of arms. The purpose of this
article is to examine the fundamental rights recognized by the Second Amendment, not its
outer limits.
14. For a thorough explanation of the meaning the Founders ascribed to the militia
clause, and why it does not interfere with an individual right to bear arms, see SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTIrUTION OF THE CoM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SE S., THE RIGHT
To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 4-5 (COMML PRINT 1982) ("REPORT ON THE CoNSTrurrION"); Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Sel-Preservation, 39 ALA. L REV.
103, 105-08 (1987); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Tbward a
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HAv. J.L & PuB POLY 559, 598-600, 622-32
(1986).
15. Donald B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH L REv., 204, 212-13 (1983) (citing GEORGE D.NEwrON & FRANKLIN
E. ZIMBING, FIREARms AND VIOLENCE IN AMERIcAN LnE 113 (1970)); John Levin, The Right 7b
Bear Arms: The Development of The American Experience, 48 CHL-KENr L REv. 148 (1971).
Vol. 36:15
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Second Amendment as necessarily tied to Article I, section 8,
clauses 15 and 16 of the United States Constitution that authorize
Congress to call out the militia, and to organize, arm, and discipline
it16
Individual Rights
The "individual rights" school relies primarily on the Second
Amendment phrase, "the right of the people," to argue that
individuals, not states, possess the protected interest Although the
Amendment does recognize a right to a militia, one should not
construe this as evidence that the Founders did not also
acknowledge the individual right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment
An examination of English history clarifies the Founders' intent
in drafting the Second Amendment. As long ago as 670 A.D.,
Englishmen were required to possess arms and to serve in the
military.17  This obligation continued for centuries, requiring
noblemen, and later commoners, to keep arms and participate in
the militia.18 The obligation to keep arms was not solely to support
military service in the King's army; English citizens were also
required to provide local police services, such as pursuing criminals
and guarding their villages. 19
By the 1660's, however, the individual right to bear arms was in
jeopardy. Charles II, and later James II, began to disarm many of
their Protestant subjects.20 James II was an unpopular monarch
whose policies provoked deep resentment among both political and
See also Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy & the Second Amendment, 26 VAL U. L REv.
107, 108 (1992); David C. Williams, Civil Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991); Aammcm CiviL LIBEmms UNION,
Poucy GuIDE OF TE AmmCuc CIvI% LmEwr'Es UNION 95 (1986).
16. The United States Constitution provides, in part, that the legislature has the power
[151 To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
[16] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress[.]
US. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 15; 16.
17. Hardy, supra note 14, at 562 (citing 1 J. BAGLEY & P. RowLY, A Docum TARY HIMORY
OF ENGLAND 1066-1540, 152 (1965)).
18. Id. at 563-65.
19. Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
Law Tradition, 10 HAsrINGs CONST. LQ. 285, 291-92 (1983).
20. Hardy, supra note 14, at 574-79.
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religious communities. Ultimately, he fled England during the
Glorious Revolution.21  One outcome of the Revolution was
Parliament's passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689, codifying
the individual right to bear arms. The Bill of Rights provided that
all Protestants "may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their
condition and as allowed by law."22 Under the Bill of Rights, the
right to bear arms for self-defense and the right to petition the King
were the only individual rights acknowledged.2
The American colonies adopted this right to bear arms from the
English model.24 Besides requiring all men between the ages of
sixteen and sixty to be liable for military service,2 many colonial
laws also required all men to own guns. For example, a 1631
Virginia law required "all men that are fittinge to beare armes, shall
bring their pieces to church. . . " for drill and target practice.26 By
1658, the law required every man to keep a functioning weapon in
his house.27 These laws served the twofold purpose of allowing
individual self-defense while giving Britain a reserve force available
in time of war.
Following the French and Indian War, England increased taxes,
discouraged expansion into the American interior, and stationed a
large army in the colonies. Consequently, the colonists increasingly
resented England. Editorials appeared in leading colonial
newspapers declaring that the colonists had the right to arm
themselves against British injustice.28
21. 1& at 579. Obviously, a full explanation of the religious and political quarrels that
befell England in the Seventeenth Century is beyond the scope of this article, but these
events are important in tracing both the common law right to bear arms and the
consequences of the government's interference with that right. For a thorough explanation of
this period of England's history, see T. MAcAutAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
ACCESSION OF JAMEs H (11th ed., London 1858); J.R TANNER, ENGLISH CONS TONAL CONFUICS
OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURy (1928).
22. Malcolm, supra note 19, at 305 (citing 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689)). For a
discussion of the meaning behind the Catholic-Protestant distinctions in the English Bill of
Rights, see JoYcE LEE MALcoL To KEEP AND BEAR ARms 122 (1994).
23. The remainder of the charter consisted of enumerated powers accruing to the
government STEPHEN HAiBROOy, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 46 (1984).
24. Nearly the entire body of English law was adopted by the colonies. MALCOLM, supra
note 22, at 138.
25. ld. at 139.
26. Hardy, supra note 14, at 588 (citing W. HENING, THE STATurES AT LARGE: BEING A
COuC'rON OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FbRST SEsSION OF THE LEGImLATURE IN m
YEAR 1619, 173-74 (1823, reprinted 1969)).
27. I.
28. Id, at 589-90. The Boston Evening Post argued that it was lawful for colonists to
take up arms to prevent British abuses. A week later, The New York Journal Supplement
called the right to keep arms a "natural right," citing Blackstone for the efficacy of guns in
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Shortly after the "Boston Tea Party," English soldiers, led by
General Gage, attempted to disarm the colonists. The British
Parliament banned all exports of muskets and ammunition to the
colonies and began seizing colonists' weapons and ammunition.2
This repression resulted in widespread formation of militia
organizations, manned by colonists wielding their own firearms.30 In
February 1775, a colonial militia prevented the British from seizing
firearms at an armory in Salem, Massachusetts. Two months later,
the colonists defeated British troops at Concord.31 Distinguished
colonial leaders, such as George Washington and Samuel Adams,
were instrumental in the organization and mobilization of local
militias.
32
The individual right to bear arms, a traditional right in both
England and the colonies, was a factor in the colonists' victory
over the British army in the Revolutionary War. Commoner
colonists supplied most of the arms necessary to defeat the
British.3 3 It was not merely the benefit of arms that made an
impression on the Founders, but also the resentment evoked by the
British in their attempt to disarm the colonists.-4 The Revolutionary
experience paralleled the abuses and disarmament policies of the
English monarchs a century earlier. Like the English in 1689, the
American Founders codified the individual right to bear arms to
prevent government tyranny.
Early State Constitutions
Provisions specifying the right to bear arms provided a
framework for the Founders in drafting the Constitution and Bill of
Rights.35 The centuries-old right to possess arms and the violation
of that right provoked the American Revolution and was, therefore,
prominent in the minds of the drafters of the newly-formed states'
constitutions. Many state constitutions contained statements about
arms, militias, and standing armies. For example, Pennsylvania's
Bill of Rights contained the provision, "[t]hat people have a right to
resa-aining the violence of oppression. Id, at 589-90 (citing 0. DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER
MnrrARY RuLE xi, 17 (1936)).
29. ld, at 589-90.
30. HmmooK, supra note 23, at 60.
31. Hardy, supra note 14, at 591.
32. HALBRooK, supra note 23, at 60.
33. Id at 63.
34. STEPHE HAooK, A RiGHT TO BEAR ARMS 17 (1989).
35. Id, at VIL
1997
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bear arms for the defense of themselves, and the state."36
Other state constitutions, however, were not as explicit about an
individual right to possess firearms. For example, although the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 mentioned a right to keep and
bear arms for the common defense, it also granted individuals the
right to defend life and liberty.3 This latter provision would have
been meaningless if Massachusetts did not allow individual citizens
to keep and bear arms.3
Among the states that did not specifically mention a right to bear
arms, two anomalies stand out.3 First, because the colonists
mistrusted standing armies, every state created a "general militia"
requiring temporary service by nearly every adult male in the state,
as opposed to a "select militia" more akin to a standing army.40 A
general militia, unlike a government-sponsored militia, required
citizens to provide their own arms. Without an individual right to
keep and bear arms, this general militia would have been
essentially defenseless. Second, even if an individual right to bear
arms was not explicitly articulated, it was assumed to exist. State
constitutions that did not mention a right to possess arms often
mentioned the citizen's right to life, liberty, and property, as well as
the right to defend those rights.
41
Six states did not adopt any bill of rights. The remainder of state
constitutions were silent on the right to bear arms.4 One cannot
deduce from such an omission that these states failed to recognize
the right to bear arms. Such an inference would then force the
conclusion that citizens had no right to life, liberty, and property.
Perhaps state leaders believed that these natural rights were
adequately protected, thereby eliminating the necessity of
enumerating them in a bill of rights. 3 More likely, the Founding
Fathers feared that enumeration of such rights would give the
government more control over individuals since it might encourage
36. PA. DEc. OF RIGHrs, art XIII (1776). Three other states explicitly recognized the
right to bear arms: North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts. HALBRooK, supra note 34, at
D.
37. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. I, art. XVIL
38. HALBROOK, supra note 34, at 42.
39. Id, at 51. States that recognized a militia, but not an explicit individual right to bear
arms, included Vhrgjnia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Hampshire.
40. Id. at 52.
41. MALcoLM, supra note 22, at 148-49.
42. HMAROox, supra note 34, at ix. New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia
adopted constitutions, but no bill of rights Id. at 79. Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted
neither a constitution nor a bill of rights, but relied on their royal charters instead. Id. at 97.
43. MALCOLM, supra note 22, at 148.
Vol. 36:15
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an erroneous assumption that natural rights must be listed to
receive protection.44
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights
Reports of the debates on the ratification of both the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights further evince the Founding
Fathers' belief in an individual right to possess arms. While
information about the proceedings is incomplete, the evidence
provided by the existing documentation is overwhelming that the
Founders supported inclusion of an individual right to possess
firearms.
The Federalist Papers demonstrate that Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison both supported an individual right to bear arms.
Hamilton's Federalist 28 argued that when government becomes
tyrannical, "the citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without
system, without recourse, except in their courage and despair."45 In
Federalist 29, Hamilton noted that although America might need a
standing army in the future, the army could never abuse the people
"while there is a large body of citizens little, if at all inferior to
them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend
their own rights and those of their fellow citizens."
46
Madison also acknowledged the right to keep and bear arms. In
Federalist 46, he explained that a federal army could never impose
its will on the people if it had to oppose "a militia amounting to
near a half a million of citizens with arms in their hands . . .
fighting for their common liberties."
47
Other prominent Founders, such as Noah Webster, echoed
Madison's view.
Before a standing army can rule the people, the people must be disarmed; as
they are in almost every kingdom of Europe. The Supreme power in
America cannot enforce urjust laws by the sword; because the whole body
of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any bands of
regular troops that can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States.48
To ensure that individuals maintained the right to bear arms,
44. Id. at 149-50. New Jersey explicitly adopted the Common Law of England, a tactic
its leaders believed would sufficiently protect the colonists' natural rights. Id.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 at 178-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
46. Id. at 179-80.
47. THE FaERusr No. 46 at 320-21 (James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
48. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution 43 at XX (1787), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITMON OF THE UNITED STATES 56
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888).
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Madison drafted the Bill of Rights based on a pamphlet composed
of proposed amendments from state ratifying conventions.4 No
right appeared more frequently in state constitutions than the right
to bear arms. In fact, this right appeared in seven state
constitutions while the right to free speech appeared in only
three.60 When Madison introduced his proposed rights to the House
of Representatives, he interspersed them throughout the
Constitution, rather than adopting an appendix that listed the
amendments separately, as does the present Bill of Rights. Madison
placed the right to bear arms among those that later became the
First Amendment individual rights to free speech, religion, and
press.51 It is no accident that the right to bear arms was not placed
in the militia clause of the Constitution, but rather among
fundamental individual rights.6
Collective rights advocates interpret the placement of the right to
bear arms in a separate amendment as proof that First Amendment
rights are individual rights while the Second Amendment is
exclusively a state right. Such a reading is inconsistent with the
Amendment's placement in the Bill of Rights. The collective rights
school also must explain why the Founders used the phrase, "the
people," to refer to individual rights in the First and Fourth
Amendments if, in the Second Amendment, the Founders meant to
protect only a state right. Such a reading is implausible because the
Supreme Court has held in other cases that "the people" refers to
individuals in all of the amendments.63
Madison's organizational plan was not implemented. The House
of Representatives, however, passed a version of the Second
Amendment similar to Madison's proposal. No delegate voted
against this measure. 4 Although, no official records remain of the
debates, the writings of John Randolph explain that the Senate
rejected a proposal limiting the right to keep and bear arms to
activities for "the common defense."5 This supports the conclusion
49. Robert A. Rutland, Faming and Ratiyijng the First Ten Amendments, in THE
FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 305 (Leonard W. Levy and Dennis J. Mahoney
eds., 1987).
50. Hardy, supra note 14, at 607.
51. Other individual rights, such as the prohibitions against bills of attainder and
ex-post facto laws, remained in the final draft of Article L
52. Hardy, supra note 14, at 609.
53. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 258 (1990) (holding that "the
people" in the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments applies to "individuals").
54. CLAYION E. CRAME, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE 57 (1994).
55. 4 MAX FARRAND, REcORDs OF THE FEDmAL CONVEmON 93 (Yale Univ. Press ed. 1966)
Vol. 36:15
Private Enforcement of the Social Contract
that the Senate had no desire to confine the right to bear arms to
military activities.6
The Militia
Although an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of "militia" is
beyond the scope of this article, the individual rights school deems
such analysis unnecessary because whatever "militia" means does
not negate the peoples' right to keep and bear arms. The militia of
the late 1700's bore no resemblance to the organized,
government-sponsored national guard of today. References to
national guard-like units were usually to "select militias." On the
other hand, references to the militia were usually synonymous with
the "body of the people," suggesting an armed populace. 7 The state
constitutions, drafted during and after the Revolutionary War, used
the phrase, "body of the people" to describe militias.
The Founders also used this terminology. George Mason asked,
"Who are the militia, if they be not the people of this country?"w
Tench Coxe, arguing that the nation need not fear a large standing
army, wrote, "[tihe militia, who are in fact the effective part of the
people at large . . . "60 Alexander Hanson, a member of the
Maryland ratification committee, opined that if the army grew too
large, "could we not . . . depend on the militia, which is
ourselves[?]" 61 The same Congress that ratified the Bill of Rights
also enacted the Militia Act of 1792. This Act included in the term
"the militia" all able-bodied males, aged eighteen to forty-five.6 The
Act required each man to provide his own weapon.6
Common sense suggests that the Founders would not, in drafting
the Second Amendment, recognize a state military force and yet fail
to protect an individual right to keep arms. In addition to a
tradition of armed citizens composing the militia, the Founders had
(1911).
56. CRAMER, supra note 54, at 58-59.
57. Hardy, supra note 14, at 623-24.
58. Id.
59. JONATHAN Ewucr, THE DEBATE OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOMPON OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTrON § 3:425 (Burt Franklin, 1888). See CRAMER, supra note 54, at 9 for
overview of Founders' debates on the militia
60. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution for the United States of America
20-21, in PAMnmrs, supra note 48, at 150-51.
61. Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of Federal Government
21, in PAmns, supra note 48, at 234-235.




just fought the Revolutionary War. The conflict involved armed
colonists organized in small units fighting the legal government.
Omitting the individual right to bear arms to justify the imposition
of a state army violates every tenet of reason.
IL THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
Introduction
The Second Amendment is no model of clarity, but the Court's
attempts at interpretation have only obscured its meaning further.
The Court has provided little, if any, guidance to those interested in
defining the parameters of the Second Amendment. Most of the
Court's decisions are tangential to the right to bear arms. For
example, does the Second Amendment protect private militias64 or
a citizen from being disarmed by another citizen? Not until 1939
did the Court attempt to define the guarantees of the Second
Amendment.0 The scant number of cases can be partially explained
by the Court's deference to state law before the era of
incorporation, as well as the lack of a federal statute regulating
firearms. The Court's neglect of the Second Amendment after World
War II is inexcusable, leaving the nation with serious questions
about the right to bear arms.
Reconstruction and Post-Reconstruction Cases
The first major case exploring the Second Amendment was
United States v. Cruikshank.6 7 Cruikshank concerned members of
a mob (including William Cruikshank) indicted for invading a
freedmen's meeting.6 The United States Circuit Court for the
District of Louisiana found the Constitution only prohibited
infringement by state action, unless the plaintiffs could prove that
the mob had racially-based motives.6 The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that while the Fourteenth Amendment prevents state
64. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
65. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
66. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
67. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Second Amendment was first acknowledged in Dred Scott
v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney warned that if free blacks
became United States' citizens, they could "keep and carry arms wherever they went." Id. at
417. Note that Taney implicitly acknowledged the individual rights nature of the Second
Amendment.
68. At this meeting, the defendants confiscated the attendants' weapons and prevented
them from voting in a state election. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 542-43.
69. United States v. Cruikshank, 25.F Cas. 707, 712 (C.C.D. La. 1874)
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infringement of some individual rights, it does not protect citizens
from infringement by other private citizens.70 Thus, because the
actions of the mob only arose to the level of private action, the
federal government had no jurisdiction to intervene.
7 1
Although the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
Cruikshank, nonetheless, raises several important points regarding
the post-Civil War Court's analysis of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court relied on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause72 of the Fourteenth Amendment in its discussion of
federalism, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the
protections of the Bill of Rights against state action only to those
rights related to the national government.73 For example, peaceably
assembling to petition Congress for redress of grievances is
protected from state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment
Certain rights enumerated in the First Amendment are not so
protected because they do not relate to the national government,
but left by the Constitution to state regulation.74
In holding that the Second Amendment was not incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court added, "[t]he right . . . of
bearing arms for a lawful purpose ... is not a right granted by the
Constitution; neither is it any manner dependent upon that
instrument for its existence. The Second Amendment declares that
[the right to bear arms] shall not be infringed, but this means no
more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. "7 The Court
concluded that citizens should look to local law or the police to
protect against local violations.76 Craikshank is irrelevant in
modem times because it exemplifies archaic Constitutional
reasoning. 77  However, the Cruikshank Court recognized the
70. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
71. Id. at 552.
72. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONS. amend. XIV. "Privileges and
imunities" referred only to those rights created by the Constitution, and thus, did not
include natural rights. REPoRr ON THE CONSTrUTON, supra note 14, at 9. Protected rights
included voting in federal elections and interstate travel - rights that were not "natural," but
existed because of the federal government Id. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
73. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 546.
74. IdL
75. Id at 553.
76. Id.
77. Despite the demise of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, some scholars still cite
CruiJshank to buttress an anti-gun position. CRAmE, supra note 54, at 125-26 (citing MICHAEL
K BEARD & SAMUEL L FIEw, NATIONAL COALITION To BAN HANDGuNs STATEMENT ON THE SECOND




individual nature of the Second Amendment.78 Despite the Court's
rationale based on the discredited Privileges and Inmunities
Clause, Cruikshank explicitly holds that the right to bear arms
cannot be infringed.79 Moreover, the Court held that the right to
bear arms is independent of, and antecedent to, the Constitution, a
document that merely recognized the pre-existing natural right.
The Court's next Second Amendment case was Presser v.
///inois.80 In Presser, the plaintiff organized an armed workers'
militia for the purpose of "improving the mental and bodily
condition of its members so as to'qualify them for the duties of
citizens of a republic."81 Illinois indicted Presser for violating a
statute that prohibited groups of armed men from acting as a
private militia without a license from the governor82 Presser
alleged that this statute violated his Second Amendment rights 8
The Presser Court found for Illinois, holding the Second
Amendment inapplicable in dicta. Citing Cruikshank, the Court
described the Second Amendment as a limit only upon the "power
of Congress and the national government, not upon the states."14
The Court, however, acknowledged a limit on the state's authority
by noting:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the
reserved military force or the reserve militia of the United States as well as
of the states, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as
well as of its general powers, the states cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful
resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
performing their duty to the general government.8
Whether the Court viewed the Second Amendment as conferring
rights on individuals, states, or both, is uncertain. The Court,
however, did acknowledge that a state could not interfere with the
individual right to keep and bear arms when such regulation
interfered with the "public security" of the United States.
Like Cruikshank, Presser's value in determining the scope of the
right to keep and bear arms is limited. Both cases acknowledged in
78. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
79. Id. at 553.
80. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
81. Presser, 116 U.S. at 254.
82. Presser v. Illinois, 98 m. 406 (1881).
83. Presser, 116 U.S. at 260.
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id,
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dicta an individual right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment, but they also held the Amendment inapplicable to the
states. Nevertheless, Cruikshank and Presser are irrelevant today
because they were decided well before the Bill of Rights was
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. This presumably
nullifies any ability of states to infringe upon the right to bear
arms.
Other Supreme Court Cases, 1894-1914
The Court again considered whether the Second Amendment
limited state action in Miller v. Texas.M In Miller, the defendant
appealed his murder conviction to the Supreme Court, contending
that a Texas law permitting a warrantless arrest of anyone carrying
a weapon violated the Second and Fourth Amendments.87 The
Court presumed that the Second Amendment "only operates on the
federal power," but added that the Fourteenth Amendment might
apply this restriction to the states.18 The defendant, however, failed
to raise the Fourteenth Amendment issue at trial, and thus, the
Court refused to consider it. The Court presumed the Second
Amendment was inapplicable to the states.8 Today, Miller is
viewed as a trivial Second Amendment case. The Court's view that
prescribed limitations are binding "only on the federal power" has
been long discredited.
During this era, the Court considered two other cases with
Second Amendment implications: Robertson v. Baldwin9O and
Patsone v. Pennsylvania.91 In Robertson, the plaintiffs, a group of
seamen, argued that the Bill of Rights prohibited their forcible
return to ship without due process. The Court held that the Bill of
Rights did not create new rights, but merely embodied certain
guarantees derived from English common law. These English
common law rights had, "from time immemorial," contained certain
exceptions when necessity dictated.92 Among these rights and
exceptions was the individual right to bear arms. "[Tihe right of the
people to keep and bear arms (Article 2) is not infringed by laws
86. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
87. Mi//er, 153 U.S. at 536.
88. Id,
89. Id at 538.
90. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
91. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
92. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281.
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prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons."9 The Court listed
other rights in this category, such as the rights to free speech and
press and the ban on double jeopardy."
The Court, in Robertson, evidently categorized the Second
Amendment as an individual right. First, the Court found it illogical
that a law prohibiting concealed weapons could be applicable to a
militia. Secondly, the Amendment's placement among other
fundamental individual rights within the Bill of Rights implied it
was an individual right. Finally, the Court acknowledged that the
right to bear arms predated the Constitution - a common law
right the Founders themselves had not created, but simply
recognized as beyond government infringement
In Patsone, the plaintiff challenged a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting all unnaturalized foreign-born residents from killing
"any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property."
Accordingly, the statute barred such persons from owning a rifle or
shotgun.95 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, upheld the
statute because "the prohibition does not extend to weapons such
as pistols that may be supposed to be needed occasionally for
self-defense." Therefore, the statute was found constitutional.9
Under Patsone, it is arguable that Holmes intended to imply that
because pistols are necessary to protect individuals from harm,
they are not subject to legislative restrictions. On the other hand,
Holmes may have intended to suggest that, absent specific
language, a law prohibiting hunting did not ban weapons such as
pistols that are rarely used in hunting.
Robertson and Patsone provide little insight into the boundaries
of the Second Amendment. Patsone is ambiguous - its discussion
of weapons only tangential to the decision. Robertson is of some
value because it recognizes implicitly the individual right to bear
arms and expressly recognizes the long history of a right that
predates the Constitution. However, Robertson's discussion of the
right to bear arms is contained in dicta and does not provide
persuasive support for an individual rights interpretation of the
Second Amendment
93. Id. at 282.
94. Id. at 281-82.
95. Patsone, 232 U.S. at 143.
96. Id. at 144.
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United States v. Miller
After Patsone, the Court was silent on the Second Amendment
for twenty-five years until United States v. Miller.97 In Miller, the
defendants challenged the National Firearms Act of 1934 that
prohibited interstate transportation of unregistered sawed-off
shotguns. The district court took judicial notice that a sawed-off
shotgun was a militia weapon, but held that such federal
prohibition would violate the Second Amendment. 8
The government appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, but dropped all charges against the defendants. As a result,
the defendants filed no brief opposing the government's appeal.9
The Court reversed, holding that before it would take judicial
notice that a sawed-off shotgun was ordinary military equipment,
the defendants must prove that such a weapon has some
"reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well-regulated militia " 100
The Court also stated that the "obvious purpose" of the Second
Amendment was to provide for the militia The question was: What
was the militia?'0 1 The Framers' debates on the Constitution "show
plainly enough that the militia comprised all males capable of
acting in concert for the common defense . . . [a]nd further, that
ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to
appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in
common use at the time."1°2
Although the Miller Court focused on the "militia" aspect of the
Second Amendment, it did not deny an individual right to bear
arms. By defining "the militia" to include "all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense," the Court
endorsed a broad class of persons who could possess firearms, a
view that dramatically supports the individual rights position.
Moreover, although the Miller Court held that the Second
Amendment relates to the militia, its practical effect is to create a
well-armed populace - a scenario endorsed by individual rights
advocates. Finally, it is important to note that the Court never
mentions the National Guard. Common sense dictates that had the
Court meant an organized disciplined group such as the Guard, it
97. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
98. Id,
99. CRAmFu, supm note 54, at 188.
100. Milier, 307 U.S. at 178.
101. Id.
102. Id, at 179.
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would have referred specifically to such a group and would not
have used the term "body of the people."
More surprising, perhaps, is Millers interpretation of what
weapons the militia may possess, i.e., "those in common use at the
time."10 Presumably, militia weapons in common use today might
include machine guns and automatic rifles. Miller, then, could
support both competing views of the Second Amendment. The
individual rights school must accept that in the Court's only major
Second Amendment case, it did not explicitly recognize an
individual right to bear arms. The collective rights view may have
won a Pyrrhic victory when the Court defined "militia" to include
the "body of the people," but the Court also seemed to endorse
widespread ownership of guns, as the Founders originally intended.
The practical significance of Miller is also arguably limited. The
decision provides no insight into the relationship among the
individual, the government, and the arms. Unfortunately, it is the
Court's last word on the Second Amendment. By refusing to grant
certiorari to cases presenting Second Amendment issues after
Miller in 1939, the Court has effectively washed its hands of one of
the most important debates of the post-World War II era.
Is the Second Amendment Incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Miller, Cruikshank, and Presser interpreted the Second
Amendment as a restraint only on federal - not state, local, or
private - interference with the right to bear arms. The Court
decided these cases more than one hundred years ago, before
ruling that the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore, applicable to the states. The Court's
denial of certiorari to recent Second Amendment cases has not
only obscured the right to bear arms, but has also deprived the
Court of the opportunity to decide whether the Second Amendment
is applicable to the states. Although nearly all provisions of the Bill
of Rights have been explicitly incorporated, 104 the Second
Amendment has not. Many federal district and circuit courts have
103. Id.
104. The Court has never accepted the "total incorporation" theory. Instead, it has
employed a "selective incorporation" test, incorporating rights on a piecemeal basis. TRisE,
supra note 7, at 721. The only amendments that have not been explicitly incorporated are
the Second and Third Amendments, the Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement, and the
Seventh Amendment Id.
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held that the Second Amendment is not incorporated. 10 The
arguments favoring incorporation, however, are so convincing that
to hold otherwise is wholly inconsistent and intellectually
dishonest.
The most famous gun-control case of the post-war era and a
profound example of the judicial misinterpretation of the
incorporation doctrine is Quilci v. Morton Grove.10° Quilci involved
a ban on the private ownership of handguns in Morton Grove,
Illinois. The plaintiffs, local gun owners, filed an action to stop
enforcement of the law.107 The district court granted Morton Grove
summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The plaintiffs contended
that: (1) the Presser Court had already recognized that a state
could not prohibit people from bearing arms; and (2) Pressers
holding that the Second Amendment is not applicable to the states
was overruled when the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
entire Bill of Rights (including the Second Amendment).1 8 The
Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments.1°9
Quilci provided an excellent opportunity for the Court to address
the right to keep and bear arms. Unfortunately, the Court's failure
to grant certiorari not only resulted in an extension of the gun
control debate, but also a continuation of the incorporation
question, a matter that the Court should have decided years ago.
Citing Presser for the proposition that the Second Amendment is
not incorporated is an argument long ago rejected by the Supreme
Court. Presser is inconsistent with modem incorporation
doctrine.110
The Court's selective incorporation of some, but not all of the
Bill of Rights, has placed the status of the Second Amendment in
virtual limbo. By applying a "selective incorporation" approach
toward the Bill of Rights, the Court unfairly burdens the individual
rights position. As long as the Court refuses to hear Second
Amendment cases, the threshold incorporation issue will remain
unanswered. Although the individual rights school has a plausible
105. United States v. Nelson, 859 F2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988); Quilci v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 E2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); United States. v. Oakes,
564 F2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
106. 695 F2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
107. Quilci, 695 F2d at 262-63.
108. Id. at 270.
109. Id.
110. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 307 U.S. 643 (1961);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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argument for why the Amendment should be considered
incorporated, it must first acknowledge that the Court has never
expressly incorporated the right. However, when the Court accepts
a Second Amendment case in the future, there is ample reason to
believe that the Court will incorporate the Second Amendment.
In deciding whether a provision of the Bill of Rights is
incorporated, the Supreme Court has traditionally asked: (1) how
deeply is the right rooted in our Anglo-American heritage;"' and (2)
how greatly did the Founders value the right?112 The records of the
Founding Fathers reveal that they highly valued the right to bear
arms. In addition, the right had been part of English tradition for
centuries, passing to the colonies in the Seventeenth Century."
3
Only an au contrario argument against incorporation is
consistent - the Second Amendment grants states the right to
equip and maintain a militia. Holding that a state militia is not
subject to state regulations would be contradictory. The Founders'
primary intent in drafting the Second Amendment was not to grant
states the right to create their own militias, but rather to recognize
an individual right to bear arms.
Opponents of the right to bear arms often claim that the Second
Amendment is not incorporated. While they are correct in holding
that the Court has never explicitly incorporated the Second
Amendment, they also must acknowledge that the Court has not
heard a right to bear arms case in several decades. According to
the Court's own incorporation test, as well as the demise of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Second Amendment is
immune from state and local infringement. The debate over
incorporation is merely another indicator of the Court's
unwillingness to decide a Second Amendment case.
Post-Miller
That the Court has not decided a Second Amendment case since
Mi//er seems irresponsible, given today's tumultuous gun control
debate and the abundance of lower court cases from which to
111. Kates, supra note 15, at 253 n.211 (discussing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1960)).
112. Kates, supra note 15, at 254 n.214 (discussing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)).
113. There is also evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
that the Second Amendment apply to states Kates, supra note 15, at 256. The Fourteenth
Amendment was passed in response to the "black codes" states used to deprive blacks of
their fundamental rights, including the right to bear arms. Id.
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choose. In a recent decision, however, the Court provided support
for interpreting the Second Amendment as applying to individuals
and offered a glimpse of how it might decide a right to bear arms
case in the future.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,"4 the Court held the
Fourth Amendment inapplicable to search and seizure of property
located in a foreign country and owned by nonresident aliens."5
Exploring the phrase, "the right of the people," in the Fourth
Amendment, the Court noted that "the people" was a "term of art"
employed in selected parts of the Constitution, including the
Preamble and the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.1 6 This textual analysis suggests that the phrase refers
to "a class of persons who are part of a national community."" 7
Verdugo-Urquidez vindicates the individual rights view of the
Second Amendment. The Court does not mention any limitations
on this "right of the people" due to the existence of a militia.
Rather, the Court classifies it with other "obvious" individual rights
using the same terminology as in the Second Amendment. 8
Although Verdugo-Urquidez does not decisively recognize the
individual right to keep and bear arms, it does provide evidence
that the Court might interpret the Second Amendment as the
Founders originally intended. It is implausible that the Founders
would have accorded "the people" more than one meaning. The
Verdugo-Urquidez Court validates the canon that language should
be accorded a consistent reading throughout the Constitution.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has done "the people" a great disservice by
refusing to grant certiorari to a Second Amendment case in the last
sixty years. Attempts to advocate either the "collective right" or the
"individual right" position by relying exclusively on previous
decisions of the Court is impossible. The rulings of the Court are
contradictory, ambiguous, illogical, and frequently based upon
discarded judicial doctrine. Although Verdugo-Urquidez indicates
114. 494 U.S. 258 (1990).
115. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
116. 1d
117. Id, at 259-60.
118. The Court's holding that "the people" applies to individuals "who are part of the
national community" does not mean that the other amendments do not provide an individual
right. The Court specifically mentions the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as individual rights
that are fundamental to every individual, not only to United States citizens. Id, at 261.
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how the Court might find in a future Second Amendment case, the
Court must accept such a case first.1 9
IL TOWARD A NEW READiNG OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: DESHANEY
V. WINNEBAGO CouNTY DEPARTMENT OF SocIAL SERVICES
Introduction
The Founders themselves did not seem to distinguish between
the "personal safety" and "political safety" justifications for an
individual right to bear arms.1 20 One reason is that America had no
organized police force at the time of its establishment. Like their
English counterparts, American citizens served as both state
"militia" and local "police" when the situation warranted.
121
Although there is still ample reason to distrust governments,
private individuals pose a greater and more immediate threat of
physical harm. Due to the Court's persistent refusal to hear Second
Amendment cases, Americans are uncertain of the boundaries of
the rights they possess to respond to this growing threat.
The Court, however, has laid the foundation for a decisive
victory for the individual rights view. Although this article strongly
encourages the Court to hear a Second Amendment case, its failure
to do so will not prevent victory for the individual rights school.
Surprisingly, the parties engaged in the gun debate have failed to
grasp the significance of a recent Supreme Court case that
effectively defines the individual right to bear arms issue. Perhaps
Second Amendment scholars overlook this case because neither the
Court nor the parties specifically addressed the Second
Amendment.122
119. Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Printz v. United States, seemed
eager for the Court to accept such a Second Amendment case. He noted that if the Second
Amendment protects an individual right, the federal government would be prohibited from
regulating the intrastate aspects of the sale and possession of firearms. Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2386 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas added,
"Perhaps, at some future date this court will have the opportunity to determine whether
Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arns 'has justly been
considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.'" Id. (quoting JosEPH STOxy,
COMMNTARIES ON THE CoNsfriTmoN 708 (1833, reprinted 1987)).
120. Lund, supra note 14, at 117.
121. Id. at 118.
122. DeShaney has been overlooked by nearly everyone. William Van Alstyne mentions
it in a footnote, and indicates that its holding seems inconsistent with Blackstone's residual
natural rights theory. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1248 n.43. Two other authors mention
DeS aney, briefly noting its limitation on government responsibility. See T. Markus Funk,
Gun Control and Economic Discrimination The Melting Point Case-in Point, 85 J. CmiL L
& CRMNOLOGY, 764, 800 (1995); Thomas Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain About
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Services'23
concerned a young boy ("Joshua DeShaney") who became severely
retarded after sustaining a violent beating at the hands of his
father. Members of the defendant Wisconsin Department of Social
Services ("DSS"), aware of the prolonged abuse, failed to remove
the boy from his father's custody permanently.124 Despite ample
evidence, including hospital reports of abuse, Joshua's caseworker
did nothing more than "dutifully record" the incidents and her own
suspicions of abuse. 126 Several months later, the father beat Joshua
so severely that he lapsed into a coma and suffered permanent
brain damage.1 26 In response, Joshua's mother sued the DSS under
42 U.S.C. section 1983,127 alleging that the state had violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Joshua of his liberty interest
in his own bodily integrity. DSS failed to protect him from abuse
that they knew, or should have known, was occurring.
12
The Majority Opinion
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
held that a state's failure to protect an individual from private
violence generally is not a violation of the Due Process Clause.m
Hunting, 34 How. LJ., 589, 596 (1991).
123. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
124. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. The child was placed in temporary protective custody
at a Wisconsin hospital. A Department of Social Services ("DSS") "child protection team"
enrolled the boy in a pre-school program, provided counseling services to his father, and
encouraged the father's girlfriend to leave the house. The father promised to cooperate with
the DSS in accomplishing these goals, but failed to do so. Id. at 192.
125. Id. at 192-93.
126. Id.
127. Id, Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any state or territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and [federal] laws, shall be liable to the persons injured in an action of
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (emphasis added). To prevail in a section 1983 action, a party must
prove a violation of a federally secured right, such as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment
128. Dedhaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
129. Id. at 195. There are exceptions to this. The Court acknowledged that the state
could not deny protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 197 n.3 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). A
government service might also become an "entitlement" that could not be withheld without
due process of law. Such a guaranteed right would have to be created by statute. Id. at 196
n.2 (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
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The clause merely limits the state's power to act, and does not
guarantee certain minimal levels of safety.13 Although the state may
not, by its action, deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law, it is not obligated to ensure that those
interests are protected from the harmful acts of other private
individuals. 13' "Its purpose [is] to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State [protects] them from each other.
Congress was content to leave the extent of governmental
obligation in the arena of private action to the democratic political
process."'3 The Court added, "[a]s a general matter, then, we
conclude that a state's failure to protect'an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause."'3. The Court also denied that the state's knowledge of Joshua's
perilous existence constituted a "special relationship" arising to the
level of an affrm-ative constitutional duty to protect him.'3 The
plaintiff argued that a "special relationship" existed because the
DSS was aware of the boy's precarious situation and had
"specifically proclaimed" its intention to protect him against that
danger.135 In attempting to protect Joshua from abuse, the state
acquired a duty to protect the child, and thus, the plaintiff argued,
breach of the duty constituted a substantive due process
violation. 3
The Court disagreed, holding that "[the affirmative duty to
protect arises not from the state's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help, but from the
limitation that it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
behalf." 37 The Court defined such a limitation narrowly, holding it
applicable only to situations where the state takes an individual
into physical custody and prevents him from leaving and taking
care of himself.'3 The Court reasoned, "[wihile the State may have
130. Id. at 189.
131. Id. at 195.
132. Id. at 196.
133. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
134. Id. at 189.
135. Id,
136. Id.
137. Id. at 200.
138. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. See also Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25
(1982) (holding that involuntarily committed mental patients have a Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process right to have the state provide "reasonable safety" for themselves and others);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires
states to provide adequate medical care to prisoners).
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been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it
played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to make him
more vulnerable to them.""O
The reasoning of DeShaney represents an excellent opportunity
for individual rights advocates. DeShaney defines the government's
obligation, rather than a citizen's rights. This rationale, when
applied to the right to bear arms, implicitly sets the parameters of
the debate, and turns traditional Second Amendment analysis on its
head. Rather than advocating an individual right to bear arms by
citing virtually nonexistent explicit Second Amendment caselaw,
DeShaney provides a much more compelling argument that
potentially shifts the burden of persuasion to the state in cases
concerning the right to bear arms.
DeShaney holds that government has no obligation to protect
individuals from the violence of others. One arrives at the
inevitable conclusion that, generally, the government accepts no
responsibility for preventing murder, rape, armed robbery, or any
other violent act perpetrated by one individual upon another.
Although assuming that all individuals have a right to life and
liberty,140 the Court leaves the protection of these rights solely to
the individual by declining to guarantee protection to its citizens.
Under this rationale, the magnitude of the Second Amendment
crisis becomes quite apparent. Individual protection is impossible
without the right to own firearms. An individual has no chance to
prevent, or even deter, an armed miscreant's actions if he is not
also armed.
This analysis suggests that DeShaney is the most important
Second Amendment case ever decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States. By absolving the government of responsibility for
protecting its citizens, the Court has inadvertently mandated that
the Second Amendment right to bear arms be read as an individual
139. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
140. A "right* is defined, in the abstract sense, as "justice, ethical correctness, or
consonance with the rules of law or morals." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1323 (6th ed. 1990). In
the concrete sense, it is "a power, privilege, faculty, or demand inherent in one person and
incident upon another... [antecedent] to their recognition by positive law." Id. at 1324.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive an individual of life,
liberty, or property. U.S. CONSr. amend. XV. DeShaney indicates that the Fourteenth
Amendment recognizes the paramount value of these rights.
The Preamble to the Constitution states that the purpose of the document is to "establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility ... promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty." US. CONsr. preamble. It is fair to assume that the Founders would have
considered rape and murder two acts citizens have the right to prevent.
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right. Any other interpretation of the Amendment means that the
rights of life and liberty are not rights at all, but empty promises
provided, and perhaps withdrawn, at the government's whim.
41
This view is hardly radical; it is exactly what the Founders
intended when they drafted and ratified the Second Amendment
more than two hundred years ago. Although the Second
Amendment has been subjected to a few contradictory
interpretations, DeShaney necessitates that it be read as an
individual right - a right of self-defense against the violence of
others. 142
Those who subscribe to the collective rights position may still
argue against allowing citizens the right to defend themselves with
firearms. However, because DeShaney holds that the government
need not actively protect its citizens, this view cannot withstand
close scrutiny. If the government generally has no obligation to
protect citizens, how can it prevent its citizens from bearing arms
in their own defense? Should the government ban individual
possession of firearms, it would have a monopoly on all forms of
protection, keeping law-abiding citizens at the government's mercy
for any protection received. Consequently, citizens would be in a
quandary: if they obey the law, they risk injury or death at the
hands of the lawless; and if they do not, they risk prosecution at
the hands of the government.
Yet, although the government may be aware of the danger faced
by its citizens, if it fails to protect them, it is still absolved of all
responsibility, and immune from punishment. As a result, the
government has no incentive to protect the lives of its citizens, but
a citizen who protects his own life is deemed a criminal.
Moreover, the forced surrender of the right of self-defense is
incompatible with social contract theory, upon which modem
political theory, and to a great extent, our form of government, is
141. This does not mean that if government assumed an obligation to protect us, we
would forfeit the individual right to bear and keep arms. We possess that right independently
of any obligation the government chooses to assume.
142. Nicholas J. Johnson argues, without conceding the point, that even if the Second
Amendment protects only a collective right, an individual right to bear arms might still be
found in the Ninth Amendment. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment. An
Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 Rurumas LJ. 1 (1992).
The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. Consat. amend. I
Johnson contends that the Ninth Amendment protects those unenumerated rights deemed
fundamental by the Framers. Johnson, supra, at 27. Given the vast evidence proving that the
Founders considered such a right fundamental, it might be "substantially easier" to prove the
individual right to bear arms through the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 36.
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based.'4 Social contract theory provides that we exist independent
of, and in competition with, one another in a state of nature with
no law to govern us.'" By forming a social contract with other
individuals, we agree to surrender some of the freedoms we
enjoyed in the state of nature. In exchange for our reduced
freedom, we receive political rights and government services that
supposedly make us safer and our society more capable of
functioning.1
Nevertheless, not even the most authoritarian of social contract
theorists would ever advocate surrender of the right to defend their
lives. Thomas Hobbes wrote that it is a sacred right "[b]y all means
we can, to defend ourselves."146 Hobbes considered the right of
self-defense so fundamental that it could not be waived by the
social contract with the sovereign: "a covenant not to defend
myself from force, by force, is always voyd."147 Man is guided by
his passions, and one of the greatest of these passions is fear of
violent death at the hands of another, this is the fundamental right
from which all natural law originates, and no government-made law
may supersede it.'4
John Locke, perhaps the most influential of liberal thinkers,'4
also recognized that individuals have a fundamental right to protect
themselves, a right with which the government could not
interfere. 50 What is Locke's reason for this belief? "[Blecause such
men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no
other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as
143. Thomas Jefferson claimed the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights
originated in "the elementary book of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc."
THOMAS JEFFERSON, LIVING THOUGHTS (Dewey ed., 1940). See also, CARL BEcxcMa THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922). For an overview of the role of philosophy as it relates
the right to bear arms, see generally Stephen Halbrook, The Second Amendment as a
Phenomenon of Classical Political Philosophy, FIrearms and Violence (Donald B. Kates ed.,
1984).
144. Williams, supra note 15, at 419.
145. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651, reprinted Cambridge ed. 1991); JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREA=T ON GOVERNMENT (1690, reprinted Hackett ed. 1980); LEO STRAus, THE
POLMCAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBFS (1952); LEO STRAUsS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HJfrORY (1953).
146. HOBBES, supra note 145, at 109.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 112.
149. See Terrence J. Moore, The Ninth Amendment Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw
ENG. L REv. 215 (1972).
150. "[I]t being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be
preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved the safety of the innocent is to
be preferred. and one may destroy a man war on him.. . " LocKE, supra note 145, at 14.
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beasts of prey.... "151 Locke, like Hobbes, recognized that no
agreement with the sovereign waived the right to self-defense:
This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely
tied with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what he
forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man not having the power
of his own life cannot be compact, for his own consent enslaves himself to
anyone, nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to
take away his life when he pleases.lu
Not only philosophers have viewed self-protection as a
fundamental right; William Blackstone, the great English legal
theorist, contended that preventing a citizen from defending himself
is incompatible with liberty. Blackstone divided individual rights
into two categories: "primary" and "auxiliary."153 The former
consists of those inherent rights that a person directly enjoys -
such as security, property, and liberty. The latter consists of rights
protecting primary rights, including access to courts of law, the
right to petition, and "the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defence."154
Blackstone also stated, "[If a person is attacked,] . . . it is lawful
for him to repel the attack by force. .. . [The law] considers that
the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for
injuries accompanied by force. . .. Self-defense, therefore, as it is
justly called by the primary laws of nature . . . [cannot] be taken
away by the law of society."15
American history provides examples of government's failure to
protect individuals and groups, forcing them to defend themselves.
Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond document the value of
firearms in curbing violence committed by racist whites in the
South, violence that the government did little to prevent.'5 This
threat was real; between 1882 and 1968, approximately 75% of the
4,743 persons lynched were black. 57 The authors also explain that
151. Id. at 16.
152. Id. at 23.
153. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTrONE COMMEARIES 129, 141 (1766).
154. Id. at 44.
.155. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTrARIES 4 (1766).
156. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: 7bward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. LJ. 309, 318 (1991). The authors note that the
Supreme Court sanctioned this violence. Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882) (holding that a federal criminal statute designed to protect equal privileges and
immunities for blacks from invasion by private parties was unconstitutional); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)).
157. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 156, at 352 (citing STEHEN J. WHrrEFwL, A DATH
IN THE DELTA. THE STORY OF EMNETr TILL 5 (1988)).
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the goal of the black codes was the disarming of blacks, thereby
preventing them from asserting their rights.158 Using weapons to
defend their lives and property, blacks were often successfully able
to decrease violent attacks against them.1
The fundamental right to self-defense has also been explicitly
recognized by the United Nations. The United Nations Charter
holds that "nothing in the charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense."16° The United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognizes the
individual right to self defense, holding that "[ejveryone has the
right to life, liberty, and security of person."
161
The value of a firearm in the face of obvious violence that the
government is unable to prevent is clear in other contexts. For
example, what of a physician performing legal abortions targeted
for execution by a pro-life extremist? Or an abused wife hiding
from a husband who has threatened to kill her? What if she has
already called the police twenty times, and they are unwilling to
respond immediately? While these cases are more the exception
than the norm, these scenarios exemplify situations when reliance
on the police could result in death, and why gun control cannot be
reconciled with the Court's holding in DeShaney.
DeShaney, thus, not only requires a strong individual rights view
of the Second Amendment, it also severely damages the collective
rights view by exposing the gaping weaknesses inherent in its
argument. It forces collective rights advocates to concede that life
and liberty are not rights that the Constitution enforces by either
private or public means. The Constitution does not, and should not,
guarantee that a person's rights to life and liberty will be free from
private interference. Under the collective rights view, a person
would be prevented from defending his rights to life and liberty.
This position, thus, relegates life and liberty to "goals" or "good
intentions" - certainly not "rights" requiring some type of
enforcement Such a position is incompatible with liberal theory,
ignores the foundations of modem jurisprudence, violates the
158. Id. at 344.
159: This strategy worked when blacks fought as a group against white mob violence.
They were less successful when one armed black man was attacked by a mob. Id. at 353-54.
This fact makes the right no less valuable; as with all statistics on firearms, the deterrent
effect cannot be closely measured.
160. U.N. CHrmrR, art. 51.
161. James B. Whisker, Historical Develapment and Subsequent Erosion of the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W.VK L REv. 117 n.52 (1976) (discussing UNVERMS DECLARATION
OF HumAJ RiGH S, art. 3, GA Res. 217A (El) U.N. Dec. A/810 at 71 (1948)).
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holdings of many modem international agreements, and rejects the
evidence of history.
The Dissenting Opinion
The collective rights view, to avoid the dangerous implications of
its position, might argue that DeShaney was incorrectly decided
and that the dissent was correct: government inaction can become
action, forcing the government to accept the duty to protect us.
This view, no matter how persuasive, does not change the law of
the land, requiring individuals to protect themselves from the
violence of others. However, even if Justice Brennan's dissent
became law, the ultimate result would still be an individual right to
bear and keep arms.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan challenged the majority's holding
that only physical control was "the affirmative act of restraining the
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf."162 He argued that
the decisions upon which the Court relied effectively held that "if a
state cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses to aid itself, it
cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction."163
Other cases also "have acknowledged that a state's actions - such
as the monopolization of a particular path of relief - may impose
upon the state certain positive duties."'" The Court has also found
that a state can contribute to an injury, even if the state did not
cause the harm itself.16
Justice Brennan added that a state's prior actions may decide the
constitutional significance of its inactions. 6 In DeShaney,
Wisconsin law directed citizens to depend on the DSS. The decision
whether or not to remove an endangered child rested solely with
the government agency, the DSS. The dissent noted, "[t]hrough its
child welfare program ... Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens
and governmental bodies other than [DSS] of any sense of
obligation to do anything more than report their suspicions of child
abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no one
162. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983).
165. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1968); Burton v. Wilmington Parking AutL, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
166. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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will step in to fill the gap."167
The result, Justice Brennan acknowledged, was that the DSS had
effectively condemned Joshua to a life of abuse until it intervened.
He noted, "[c]onceivably, then, children like Joshua are made
worse off by the existence of this program when the persons and
entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their jobs."168 The
dissent deemed this inaction tantamount to state action. Justice
Brennan argued that the plaintiffs should be able "to show that the
[DSS's] failure to help [Joshua] arose, not at the sound exercise of
professional judgement ... but from the kind of arbitrariness we
have in the past condemned."'6
This description of the DSS is analogous to the police and their
obligation to citizens in situations where guns have been banned.
By imposing gun control, the government has "cut off private
sources of aid," monopolized a particular path of relief, directed
citizens to rely solely on it, and retained to itself the ultimate
power to decide whether to intervene. Granted, police protection is
not a fundamental right; but if the government forces people to rely
solely on the police and precludes individuals from defending
themselves, the dissent's theory would recognize this as state
action. Justice Brennan has constructed a model of government
duty and control that could be tantamount to state action, and
thus, makes the government liable for damages under Section 1983.
Justice Brennan's model of government obligation was
implemented in a Ninth Circuit case decided soon after DeShaney.
The case provides an example of what might be expected if the
dissent in DeShaney had prevailed. In Wood v. Ostrander,"
plaintiff Wood was a passenger in a car that the police stopped for
a minor infraction. The police arrested the driver for drunk driving
and impounded the vehicle. The passenger, Wood, claimed that the
officer left her at the site of the arrest, a notorious high-crime area,
and refused to assist her in getting home. She was raped later that
evening after accepting a ride with a stranger.
17'
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that Wood
had raised triable facts concerning whether the police conduct had
167. Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. 879 F2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
171. Wood, 879 F2d at 586.
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affirmatively placed her in a position of danger. The court noted
that this was a situation distinguishable from DeShaney, in which
the state had "played no part in creating the danger."172 Because the
policeman "had arrested [the driver], impounded his car, and
stranded Wood in a high crime area at 2:30 [am.], distinguishing
Wood from the general public, a duty was triggered in the police to
afford Wood some measure of peace and safety."173
The court also noted that Wood had raised a triable issue
regarding the defendant's knowledge of the danger. Since the
defendant had been a police officer for several years, he might be
liable because of knowledge of the area's high crime rate.
"Moreover, the inherent danger facing a woman left alone at night
in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense." 74
Wood illustrates that the actions of the police can be construed
as "creating the danger" an individual faces, although that danger
comes from a third party. The policeman did nothing illegal -
because of a probable crime, he removed an adult passenger from
a car and left her in the neighborhood to which she had traveled.
The Ninth Circuit initially found the defendant liable, but on
rehearing deferred to his professional judgement. 7 5
While DeShaney and Wood are factually distinct, both
demonstrate that government inaction can be construed as action
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. In neither case did the
government actually commit the offense. In both cases, however,
the government failed to rescue an individual from a dangerous
situation, had knowledge of that situation, monopolized the path of
relief for the individual, had ultimate power in deciding to
intervene, and resulted in harm to an individual because of its
inaction.
The Brennan-Wood model is analogous to the government's
failure to prevent crime in an area by implementing strict gun
control. Such a liability system would be unsustainable for any
length of time. In DeShaney, Justice Brennan promised that courts
would defer to the decision maker's professional judgement. Wood
showed how willing the Ninth Circuit was to defer to the defendant
policeman's "professional judgement."
Regardless of the side one favors in DeShaney, the result is the
same - an individual has a right to bear arms. This conclusion is
172. Id. at 590.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id at 591.
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inevitable whether or not one subscribes to the "justice-is-blind"
theory of the DeShaney majority. By exempting government from
its responsibility to uphold our rights against violations by third
parties, the Court has effectively placed nearly the entire burden of
self-defense squarely on the individual. Rights are meaningless if
they are unenforceable. Hence, an individual rights interpretation of
the Second Amendment is the better view, as the Founders well
knew.
Collective rights adherents might attempt to ignore the individual
rights view of the Second Amendment so clearly demonstrated by
DeShaney. A ban on private weapons, coupled with the DeShaney
holding, however, will result in a government monopolization of the
ability to protect life, with no legally enforceable method to exact
that protection, or recover damages when the protection fails. Not
only does this demonstrate the irrationality of the "only a collective
right" assessment of the Second Amendment, it also flagrantly
ignores history.
Even if one agrees with the dissent in DeShaney, the same result
is reached, but under "economic" theory. If the state assumes the
duty to protect its citizens and forecloses any private form of
self-protection, inaction can arise to the level of "state action" -
leaving the state liable for damages. The potentially huge financial
burden caused by compensation of crime victims could easily
bankrupt most already struggling governments.
CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment provides an individual right to bear
arms. Overwhelming evidence supports the argument that this is
what the Founders intended. The Second Amendment's location
within the Bill of Rights, as well as its terminology, also suggests
that the right to bear arms was intended as an individual right. The
Court has been derelict in its duty to interpret the Second
Amendment decisively for much too long. Nearly every Second
Amendment decision of the Court contains language that supports
and rejects both views of the gun control debate.
The Court has also failed to clarify whether the Second
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. This
uncertainty could end if the Court granted certiorari to a Second
Amendment case. Until then, a new approach is necessary.
DeShaney clearly points to both an individual right to bear arms
and limited government responsibility for defense of the individual,
exactly as the Founders envisioned. This result is achieved whether
1997
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the majority or the dissenting view in DeShaney had prevailed.
